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REVERSIBLE REWARDS
Omri Ben‐Shahar and Anu Bradford*
University of Chicago Law School

Abstract
This article offers a new mechanism of law enforcement, combining
sanctions and rewards into a scheme of “reversible rewards.” A law enforcer
sets up a pre‐committed fund and offers it as reward to another party to
refrain from violation. If the violator turns down the reward, the enforcer
can use the money in the fund for one purpose only—to pay for punishment
of the violator. The article shows that this scheme doubles the effect of funds
invested in enforcement, and allows enforcers to stop violations that would
otherwise be too difficult to deter. It argues that reversible rewards could be
used to bolster enforcement in international and domestic law, and could
also be applied strategically in litigation.

Helpful comments were provided by Oren Bar‐Gill, Pete Leeson, Richard McAdams, Ariel Porat,
Eric Posner, and workshop participants at Harvard and the University of Chicago.
*

INTRODUCTION
There are two general ways to induce people into action. One is to reward them for
the desired behavior; the other is to punish them for the undesired behavior. The typical
normative inquiry in the law enforcement literature focuses on the reward/sanction or
carrot/stick selection and asks when one device is more effective than the other.1 A basic
insight advanced in this literature is that sanctions are superior to rewards when they are
credible: a credible threat of sanctions does not need to be carried out and thus costs
nothing. An effective reward, by contrast, needs to be paid. The typical descriptive inquiry
seeks to explain legal patterns: Does the law’s (frequent) use of sanctions and (less
frequent) use of rewards conform to the theory of efficient enforcement?
This article offers a new insight to advance the normative inquiry on efficient
enforcement. The idea is simple: instead of choosing between sanctions and rewards, an
efficient scheme could combine the two. If sanctions and rewards are interlocked together
in a particular way, compliance can be obtained at a lower cost. Specifically, we develop a
novel concept of reversible rewards; a reward that entices its recipient to comply with its
donor’s demands, reinforced with a threat that the same reward could be reversed against
its recipient in case of non‐compliance. Compliance that cannot be obtained by simple
sanctions or rewards could be induced by reversible rewards.
Reversible rewards work as follows. One party—the “Enforcer”, who is seeking to
influence the behavior of another party, the “Violator”—sets up a reversible reward fund.
The money in the fund is pre‐committed and cannot be recovered by the Enforcer. This
money is offered to the Violator as a reward for choosing a course of conduct that the
Enforcer prefers. If the Violator turns down the reward and does not change its behavior,
the Enforcer can use the money in the fund for one purpose only: to pay someone to punish
the Violator.
We show that this scheme doubles the incentive effect that money spent on
enforcement generates. This doubling effect is desirable—in fact, crucial—in situations in
Donald A. Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution of Benefit?, 13 J. Legal Stud. 57 (1984); Saul
Levmore, Saul, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of
the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 Virg. L. Rev. 879 (1986); Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci, Negative
Liability, 38 J. Legal Stud. 21 (2009); Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci and Gerrit De Geest. Carrots, Sticks,
and the Multiplication Effect, 26 J. L., Econ. & Org. 365 (2010).
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which either simple sanctions or simple rewards are ineffective. A sanction or a reward
might be ineffective because it is too costly. Sanctions could be too expensive for the
Enforcer relative to the harm they save. Similarly, rewards that succeed to buy off the
Violator’s compliance might be too high. In these scenarios where ordinary enforcement
falls short, reversible rewards can fill the void. Enforcement that might otherwise seem too
costly to be effective could be obtained at (roughly) half the cost. This leads Violators to
modify their behavior in a greater number of circumstances than conventional
enforcement schemes suggest.
To illustrate intuitively the double effect of reversible rewards, imagine a party
trying to influence the policies of election candidates through a campaign contribution of a
fixed sum. The money can be offered to candidate A or to candidate B for some quid pro
quo—some policy that a candidate is willing to support in return for this contribution. But
the contributor can do better than offering one candidate the reward. It can instead offer a
reversible reward by setting up a fund, depositing the same amount of money into it, and
offering candidate A the choice between taking this sum or having it directed to candidate
B. If candidate A declines, he would lose twice: he would lose the spending advantage over
his rival that this money could buy, and the rival would gain a spending advantage by
receiving this sum. The “wedge” that the reversible reward creates (the difference in the
spending capacity of the two candidates) is doubled, twice the face value of the reward.
This means that the contributor can get the same quid pro quo that any simple contribution
buys at half the cost by using a reversible contribution.
Reversible rewards could be used in law enforcement: an enforcer could offer a
violator a smaller reward for ending the violation, coupled with the threat that declining
the reward would lead to a confirmed sanction. This enforcement scheme would be
particularly useful in international law, where ordinary enforcement methods are limited,
threats of sanctions are rarely credible and rewards are often too costly to fund. Reversible
rewards could also be used in litigation: a defendant could offer a plaintiff a smaller
settlement, coupled with the threat that declining it would lead to trial and attrition.
Reversible rewards could also be used to advance regulation: the government could offer
rewards for regulatory compliance, backed up by sanctions for violations, and interlink the
two through a pre‐committed fund.
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The concept of reversible rewards contributes to the rewards‐versus‐sanctions
inquiry. It is also closely related to the literature on credible enforcement. This literature
has wrestled with the question how legal rights might be protected when rightholders’
threats to enforce those rights are not credible. The solutions to the credibility problem
often build on some nuanced understanding of the costs of enforcement and on various
mechanisms to overcome the credibility problem.2 In this paper we offer a solution that has
not been previously proposed or applied. Our task, therefore, is to argue that reversible
rewards are plausible, promoting enforcement in areas where the reach of ordinary
sanctions and rewards is limited.

I. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Party A engages in an activity that is harmful to party B, and which party B seeks to
stop. Denote Party A as the “Violator” and Party B as the “Enforcer.” There are two ways in
which the Enforcer can induce the Violator to discontinue its harmful behavior. It can
either sanction the Violator for causing the harm, or it can reward the Violator conditional
on the Violator ceasing the violation. Both sanctions and rewards are assumed to be costly
for the Enforcer, and the challenge is to devise an enforcement scheme that stops the
violation at the minimum private cost to the Enforcer.
To make the problem concrete, assume that the Violator’s activity causes a harm of
$100 to the Enforcer. Assume, also, that the gain enjoyed by the Violator is only $80. It is
therefore socially optimal to cease the violation. To achieve this, the Enforcer can inflict a
sanction s on the Violator, but let us assume that the cost of inflicting such a sanction is
greater than s. Specifically, assume that the cost is 1.5s. For example, to inflict a loss of $100
on the Violator the Enforcer would have to bear a cost of $150, and so on. Alternatively, the
Enforcer can offer a reward r, and let us assume that the cost of such reward is r. Namely,
sanctions cost the Enforcer more than the pain they inflict on the Violator, whereas

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. Legal Stud. 437 (1988)
(uncertainty about costs); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success
of Threats to Sue, 25 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1996) (divisibility of costs); Oren Bar‐Gill and Omri Ben‐
Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma, 1 J. Legal. Anal. 737 (2009) (sequential
enforcement).
2
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rewards consist of simple transfers of cash.
A. Simple Sanctions
The Enforcer can impose any level of sanction on the Violator. In order to deter the
violation, the sanction has to be at least $80, which equals the Violator’s gain from
violation. Thus, such a sanction costs the Enforcer at least $120.
A simple sanction is not effective in this situation. Often sanctions are levied after
the harm has already occurred and thus have only a retaliatory effect. If the Enforcer
derives no utility from retaliation, it would have no incentive to inflict a sanction if its cost
is greater than 0. Alternatively, it can be assumed that the sanction has an incapacitating
effect, forcing the Violator to cease the harmful activity. Then, it would be rational for the
Enforcer to impose it only if the cost of such a sanction does not exceed the harm it
eliminates. Since the cost of such a sanction for the Enforcer is at least $120, it exceeds the
harm of $100 that the Enforcer suffers from the violation. Thus, the Enforcer’s threat to
inflict even an incapacitating sanction is not credible. A Violator, recognizing this, is not
deterred by the threat of a sanction. Thus, simple sanctions fail to stop the violation.3
B. Simple Rewards
Alternatively, the Enforcer can induce the Violator to cease its violation by offering a
reward. Since the Enforcer has more to lose from the violation than the Violator has to
gain—recall that we assume that the violation is inefficient—there is room for a Coasian
bargain, a “bribe.” Any reward of at least $80 and of no more than $100 would make both
parties better off. Assuming, for the moment, that the Enforcer has greater bargaining
power, it can offer a reward of slightly more than $80 in return for the Violator ceasing the
violation. In reality, of course, various transaction costs might make a reward bargain
costly to achieve. What this example shows, then, is not that a reward would necessarily
succeed. All it shows is that, under perfect conditions, a successful reward can cease the
violation at the minimum cost of $80 to the Enforcer.
The question we are interested in is whether the Enforcer can do better. Can it
induce compliance without having to spend this much money in a reward?
In much of the analysis below, we will assume that sanctions are merely retaliatory. This
assumption will help us sharpen the insight that even when sanctions are least credible, the
reversible reward scheme can use them to create stronger deterrence.
3
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C. Reversible Rewards
The core contribution of this paper is to devise an enforcement mechanism that
reduces the cost of credible enforcement. We call it “reversible rewards” because it uses a
reward to lure the Violator to end the harm, but also reverses the reward against the
Violator if the Violator continues its harmful conduct. The reversible rewards scheme has
three simple elements:
(1)

The Enforcer deposits money in an irrevocable fund, which can be used for
two alternative purposes, as follows.
(2)
If the Violator ceases the harmful activity, the entire money in the fund is
given to the Violator as reward.
(3)
If the Violator does not cease the harmful activity and the Enforcer decides to
punish the Violator in retaliation, the money in the fund is used to reimburse
the Enforcer for the cost of sanctioning.
Under this scheme, the reward offered to the Violator is backed up by an explicit
threat: if the violation continues, not only will the Violator forfeit the reward, but it will also
bear a sanction. Since the cost of inflicting the sanction would be reimbursed to the
Enforcer from the fund, we say that the reward is reversible i.e., it can be diverted into a
sanction after being rejected by the Violator. Note that if the Enforcer fails to punish an
ongoing violation, the money would be squandered and may not be recovered by the
Enforcer. That the Enforcer can only recover this money as a reimbursement for a sanction
renders the Enforcer’s threat to impose the sanction credible.
A reversible reward would be significantly lower than the $80 that was necessary
for the minimum effective non‐reversible reward. Now, it is enough to deposit slightly
more than $48 in the fund to stop the violation. To see why, consider first the maximum
sanction that the Enforcer would be willing to impose if the violation continues. Expecting
to be reimbursed up to $48 from the fund, the maximum sanction that the Enforcer would
have an incentive to inflict is s = 32. This sanction would cost the Enforcer 1.5s (namely 1.5
 32 = 48), exactly the amount available in the fund. Thus, the threat to inflict a sanction of
$32 would be credible. A lower sanction would also be credible, but the Enforcer gains
nothing by lowering the sanction (the marginal cost to him of unit of sanction is $0.)
Finally, a sanction exceeding $32 would not be fully reimbursed and thus the threat to
impose it would not be credible.
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Recognizing the credibility of the threat to inflict a sanction of s= 32, the Violator has
to choose between two options: a violation, which would entail a net payoff of $48 (that is,
a gain of $80 from continuing violation minus a sanction of $32); or ceasing the violation
and collecting the reward, which would yield an immediate identical payoff of $48. Thus,
endowing the fund with a little more than $48 (say, $50) would be enough to make the
Violator strictly prefer compliance over violation. A reversible reward of at least $48 can
lead to full compliance.
D. Reversible Reward: Why It Works
The example above illustrated that the reversible reward scheme can succeed
where simple sanctions fail, and that it costs less than a simple reward. Two distinct factors
explain why the success of this scheme is general and not merely an artifact of the
particular example we chose: (1) the double effect of the expenditure—using the same
money to fund both the reward and the punishment; and (2) solving the problem of the
credibility of threats to sanction through a precommitment device.
1. The Double Effect
A reversible reward uses the same money twice. In the Introduction, we illustrated
this double effect through examples of how a campaign contribution is offered to two
opposing candidates, operating once as a carrot and another time as a stick. There, a non‐
complying candidate loses twice: first by forgoing the offered campaign contribution and,
second, by witnessing the same resource being redirected to his or her opponent.4
Put differently, the enhanced incentive to comply is generated by a “wedge”
between the payoffs available from violation and from compliance. The greater this wedge,
the stronger the incentive. This wedge can be “stretched” in two directions: the Enforcer
can offer a higher payoff for compliance, or a lower payoff for violation. A simple reward
operates in the first direction by offering a higher payoff for compliance. A simple sanction
operates in the second direction by offering a lower payoff for violation. A reversible
reward operates in both directions by doubling the wedge and thus doubling the effect of
the Enforcer’s fund.
To be sure, in equilibrium the money can be used at most once, but because it is factored into the
off‐equilibrium moves—because parties act in the “shadow” of what this money can do in differenct
scenarios—it has the double effect.
4
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The idea of resorting to both rewards and sanctions to influence parties’ incentives
is not novel. But conventionally sticks and carrots are presented as alternative ways to
enhance compliance. Under the law of restitution, a party who commits a desirable act—
rescue, salvage, enhancement of property value—can in some circumstances collect a
reward from the beneficiary. Under tort law, a party who commits an undesirable act—
injury, damage, destruction of property value—is in most circumstances liable to pay
compensation to the injured party. Saul Levmore has studied the potential simultaneous
use of sanctions and rewards.5 Levmore identified situations in which law or contracts
reward good behavior and at the same time punish bad behavior. For example, some
jurisdictions provide rewards for rescue and penalties for failure to rescue. Or, stores
incentivize sales staff by offering commissions for generating high sales and penalties for
generating low sales. Or, construction contracts sometimes include “risk/reward” terms,
with penalties for delayed completion and rewards for ahead‐of‐schedule completion. The
reversible reward mechanism differs from these examples by utilizing the double wedge
effect in a specific manner: Not only are rewards and sanctions offered simultaneously, but
their funding is linked.
We use the term “double” effect loosely. More precisely, the effect of reversible
rewards could be somewhat less than double the effect of a simple reward, depending on
the precise magnitude of the excess cost associated with sanctions. In the original example
involving a cost multiplier of 1.5s, the reward fund of $80 was reduced to somewhat less
than half, $48. The excess cost of sanction mitigated the double effect of the reverse portion
of the reward. A multiplier of 2s would mitigate the double effect even more, increasing the
required size of the reversible reward to at least $54.6 If, instead, the sanction involved
excess efficiency (a cost multiplier of less than 1, say 0.5s), the money used to finance the
sanction would have a larger incentive effect than the same money used for a reward. In
this case the reversible reward more than doubles the incentive effect and reward fund

Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay o the Evolution of Incentive Structure of the Law of
Affirmative Obligations, 72 Va. L. Rev 879, 891‐906 (1986); Saul Levmore, Carrots and Torts, in
CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 203, 221 (Eric Posner, ed., 2000).
6 Such a reversible reward fund could finance a sanction of $27. The Violator would prefer to take
the reversible reward of $54 than commit a violation and net $80 ‐ $27 = $53.
5
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would have to be less than half the simple reward.7 Thus, the cost structure of the sanction
affects the exact size of the necessary reversible reward fund, but its qualitative effect of
delivering a “dual punch” is maintained in all settings.8
2. Credible Commitment
Reversible rewards can be used with or without a pre‐committed fund.

We

mentioned the risk/reward clauses in contracts and bonus/fine schemes in employment.
The particular reversible reward scheme we develop here adds another aspect—a pre‐
commitment of the fund—which bolsters the credibility of the threat to reverse the reward
into a sanction. Because of this pre‐commitment of funds, the Enforcer has nothing to lose
by carrying out his threat to sanction. This is particularly helpful in situations where the
Enforcer would have to inflict the sanction after having already suffered the harm, and thus
would have no incentive to do so. With the effective cost of sanctioning reduced to zero at
the time the sanctions have to be implemented, the Enforcer’s threat to inflict even purely
retaliatory sanctions becomes credible through this mechanism. Indeed, as we will
demonstrate in the next section, the size of the fund that needs to be pre‐committed
depends on the type of sanctions involved. Pure retaliatory sanctions require a larger pre‐
commitment than sanctions that also have an incapacitating effect.
The success of the reversible rewards can also be analyzed through the lens of a
bargaining model. The interaction between the Enforcer and the Violator can be viewed as
a negotiation problem in which the parties bargain over the price for the Violator’s
compliance. This price depends on the parties’ relative bargaining power—the factors that
affect their respective abilities to extract a favorable concession from the other side. At the
basic level, the greater the harm suffered by the Enforcer, the more it is willing to pay for
When the cost of sanction is 0.5s, the minimum necessary fund would be just under $27. Such a
fund could finance a sanction of $54. The Violator would prefer to take the reversible reward of $27
than commit a violation and net $80 ‐ $54 = $26. It should be pointed out that when sanctions are
cheap, it would more likely be the case that simple sanction could be used to fully deter the
behavior, and reversible rewards would not be needed.
8 In some settings, a reward could also entail excess cost—the money paid by the donor is less than
the money received by the target. This factor would reduce the efficacy of rewards generally, but it
would not undermine the advantage of reversible rewards. In our original numerical example, if a
reward of r now costs 1.25r, a simple reward of $80 would cost $100. A reversible reward fund,
when the sanction has no excess cost, would cost $45. Such a fund could finance a sanction of $45
and a reward of $36. The Violator would prefer to take the reversible reward of $36 than commit a
violation and net $80 ‐ $45 = $35.
7
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the violation to end. Likewise, the greater the gain enjoyed by the Violator, the more it
demands as a reward. A simple reward is merely a bargain struck within these outside
options available to the parties—between the harm or the benefit of the violation—making
both parties better off.
A reversible reward adds to the Enforcer’s bargaining power because it changes the
outside option available to the Violator. The certainty of being subjected to an ensuing
sanction reduces the payoff from violation. Through the pre‐committed fund of the
reversible sanction the Enforcer “ties its own hands” to carry out the sanction, thus
changing the bargaining range and securing a better bargain. By using a reversible reward
the Enforcer can negotiate a more favorable deal, commensurate with the sanction the
Enforcer credibly threatens to inflict.

II. FORMAL ANALYSIS
A. Framework
A risk‐neutral Violator has an opportunity to engage in a conduct that harms
another risk‐neutral party, the Enforcer. The benefit to the Violator is b if he pursues the
activity and 0 otherwise, and the harm to the Enforcer is h if the Violator pursues the
activity and 0 otherwise.
The Enforcer can threaten to impose any sanction s, where s denotes the monetary
equivalent of the disutility of the sanction to the Violator. The cost of sanction to the
Enforcer is c(s). For simplicity, assume that the sanction cost function is linear: c(s) =  + s,
where  is a fixed cost of sanctioning and  is a variable cost multiplier. In some cases, 
can be negative, as when the Enforcer collects a monetary fine or damages from the
Violator. In other cases,  is positive, representing resources the Enforcer has to invest in
inflicting the sanction.
The Enforcer can also offer the Violator a reward r for ceasing the activity. The
reward is monetary and thus involves a simple transfer from the Enforcer to the Violator
and does not generate additional implementation costs.
If the Violator engages in the harmful activity, its payoff is b – s +r and the Enforcer’s
payoff is –h – c(s) – r.
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The parties are rational and have perfect information. The timing of their
interaction is as follows: at time 0, the Enforcer announces the sanction and reward
scheme. At time 1, the Violator chooses whether or not to pursue the harmful activity. If it
does, the Enforcer suffers an immediate harm of h. At time 2, the Enforcer can impose a
sanction in retaliation. Alternatively, if the Enforcer promised a reward and the Violator
complied with the conditions of that reward, the Enforcer must pay the reward. In this
setting, the harm occurs immediately at time 1, before and irrespective of any sanction. A
sanction can therefore only inflict some cost on the Violator, but it cannot prevent the
Violator from engaging in the activity—hence, the sanction is merely retaliatory. However,
we also discuss the setting where the sanction can be used to induce the Violator to cease
its harmful activity.
B. Simple Sanctions and Rewards
Let us consider as a benchmark the effect of simple sanctions. To deter the harmful
activity, the Enforcer has to threaten the Violator with a sanction of at least b. When the
sanction is merely retaliatory, this threat is not credible. Any sanction that costs more than
0 would only make the Enforcer’s payoff lower in comparison to the situation where the
Enforcer imposes no sanction. In both cases, the Enforcer incurs the harm h. Thus, the
decision to inflict a retaliatory sanction would yield the Enforcer a payoff of –h – c(s)
whereas the payoff from enduring Violator’s harmful activity would be –h. Once the harm
has occurred, the Enforcer has therefore no incentive to punish the Violator.
Even if the sanction can cease the harmful activity and thereby reduce the Enforcer’s
harm to 0, punishment would be rational only if c(b) ≤ h. The Enforcer would have to
impose a sanction of s = b to induce the Violator to cease its activity, and would thus have to
bear a cost of at least c(b). The Enforcer would choose to pursue a sanction only if its cost
were lower than the harm from tolerating the violation. In this case the violation can be
eliminated, and the Enforcer’s payoff would be –c(b).
Consider now the effect of simple rewards. To induce the Violator to cease the
violation, the Enforcer needs to offer a reward of at least b. The Enforcer would choose to
do this if b < h, namely, when it is cheaper to incur the cost of buying off the Violator’s
compliance than to suffer the harm of Violator’s non‐compliance.
From the Enforcer’s perspective, an incapacitating sanction is superior to a reward

10

whenever the threat to impose such a sanction is credible (whenever c(b) < h)—here, the
Enforcer would able to deter the violation at no cost since the threat need not be carried
out. In contrast, rewards are superior to sanctions every time the threat of sanctions is not
credible. If the sanction is merely retaliatory, the reward can achieve what a sanction
cannot as long as b < h. Or, if the sanction is incapacitating but c(b) > h, the Enforcer again
does not have a credible threat to impose the sanction but has the incentive to offer a
reward. Thus, if b < h < c(b), the reward works whereas a sanction does not. In the
remainder of the discussion we will assume that c(b) > h and that simple sanctions are thus
too costly to be credible. The cheaper way to prevent the harm is to offer the Violator a
simple reward of b. We will now explore whether a reversible rewards can achieve the
same result at a lower cost.
C. Reversible Rewards
At time 0, the Enforcer sets up a fund and endows it with U. The Enforcer instructs
that the fund can be used for either rewarding the Violator for compliance or, failing that,
rewarding the Enforcer for punishing the Violator. These instructions cannot be modified
or revoked. (We will comment below on the legal foundations for this assumption).
Specifically, the Enforcer instructs that:





If the Violator refrains from violation at time 1, the fund’s endowment will be
transferred in full to the Violator at time 2.
If the Violator commits the violation at time 1 and the Enforcer punishes him
at time 2, the Enforcer’s cost of punishment will be reimbursed from the
fund, up to the full amount available in the fund.
If the Violator commits the violation and the Enforcer does not punish him,
the money in the fund is squandered (e.g., donated to a neutral charity).

The fund makes the Enforcer’s threat to inflict sanctions credible in a number of
circumstances where a threat to inflict simple sanctions would lack this credibility. Denote
by s*(U) the maximum sanction that could be fully reimbursed from a fund i.e., the highest
possible sanction that meets the condition c(s) ≤ U. When c(s) =  + s, then

For example, if  = 0 and  = 1 (namely, c(s) = s), then s*(U) = U. The costlier it is to impose
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a sanction (i.e., the higher the values for  or), the lower is the maximum sanction that the
Fund can credibly support.
The question we are interested in is the following: what is the minimum necessary
fund to induce the Violator to forgo the benefit b and thus refrain from the harmful activity
altogether? Denote the minimum fund by U(b). The Violator is faced with a choice: either to
refrain from the activity and accept the reward of U(b), or engage in the activity with a
payoff of b – s*(U(b)). Given the Violator’s choice, the Enforcer chooses the minimum U that
induces the Violator to refrain from the activity:

which yields:

Several observations can be made:
1. More credible than simple sanction. Recall that for simple sanctions to work, they cannot
impose costs on the Enforcer that exceed Enforcer’s benefits from Violator’s compliance.
Even when sanctions are incapacitating, they are credible only if c(b) < h. In comparison,
the cost of setting up a Fund to deter the harmful activity is smaller any time  > 0. 
denotes the marginal cost of sanctions. Thus, any time it costs something to levy an
additional unit of sanction (that is, when the cost of the sanction depends on the size of the
sanction), a reversible reward achieves full deterrence at a lower cost than a simple
sanction. Thus, it could work as an effective enforcement scheme in situations in which
simple sanctions fail.
2. Cheaper than simple rewards. The cost of a reversible reward is lower than the cost of
simple reward any time

Thus, any time b > , a reversible reward is cheaper than a simple reward scheme,
irrespective of , the marginal cost of sanctions. The intuition is this: any time b >, the
money in the fund can be used to generate some non‐zero sanction. In contrast, when  >
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b, the fixed cost of sanction will deplete the reward fund before any pain can be inflicted on
the Violator. With the ability to sanction guaranteed, the reward necessary to create an
incentive for the Violator to give up b is smaller.
3. Example. Assume c(s) = 100 + s, and b = 200. The minimum effective sanction is 200,
which costs 300 to impose. The minimum simple reward is 200. A fund of U would generate
a credible threat to impose a sanction s* = U – 100. Thus the minimum necessary fund is U =
½ (100+b), which equals 150. It offers a reward of 150, backed by a sanction of 50.The
reversible reward scheme achieves compliance at a cost of 150, which is less than the cost
of simple sanctions or rewards. If h > 150, a reversible reward credibly eliminates the
harm, whereby a simple sanction is not credible and a simple reward is costlier in
comparison.
4. Legal Foundations. The pre‐commitment element of the fund requires that the money
would be truly sunk. The fund needs to be structured as an irrevocable trust, whereby the
trustee is barred from accommodating any conflicting ex‐post instructions by the fund’s
initiator. While contract law does not recognize the power of parties to write non‐
modifiable contracts,9 trust law provides the legal framework to make such hands‐tying
commitments.10
D. Divisible Sanction Costs
By pre‐committing a fund, the reversible reward scheme divides the strategic
decision into two stages—an initial stage in which the fund is set, and a later stage in which
the fund is utilized. We now explore an additional strategic advantage of this divisibility
effect.11
1. Numerical Example
Return to the example studied in Section I. We assumed the Violator’s benefit to be
$80, the harm from the activity $100, and the cost of inflicting a sanction s 1.5s. We noted
that a merely retaliatory sanction would never be credible because it would not eliminate
the harm of $100 and would simply amount to another expense. Cost divisibility would not
Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26
Journal of Legal Studies 203 (1997).
10 Kevin E. Davis, The Demand for Immutable Contracts: Another Look at the Law and Economics of
Contract Modification and Renegotiation, 81 New York University Law Review 487 (2006).
11 For a model of the effect of cost divisibility on the threat to enforce, see Bebchuk, supra note &&.
9
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matter, because incurring any cost greater than $0 would not be rational for the Enforcer.
Incapacitating sanctions would also lack credibility as it the Enforcer would need to incur a
cost of at least $120 to deter the harm of $100.
Cost divisibility could solve this credibility problem. The key would be for the
Enforcer to lower its sanctioning costs at time 2, when the decision to inflict the sanction is
made. This can be accomplished by dividing its costs into a pre‐committed sunk portion
and a subsequent avoidable portion. The Enforcer would deposit just enough money in the
fund at time 0 (sunk portion) to render his subsequent threat to expend the remaining cost
of the sanction credible at time 2 (avoidable portion)—thus ensuring that the threat would
not need to be carried out. In the above example the Enforcer would initially need to
deposit just over $20 in the fund, even if the fund is committed solely to finance a simple
sanction without any rewards. If the Violator subsequently engages in the harmful activity,
it would only cost the Enforcer less than $100 to pay for a fully deterring sanction at that
time. Since the upfront deposit into the fund is sunk and no longer factors into his strategic
calculation, it would be rational to spend anything under $100 to terminate the harm of
$100. Since the threat to impose a sanction becomes credible at this stage—the Violator
now knows that the Enforcer can pay the full $120 to impose a sanction that costs the
Violator a disutility of $80—the Violator would be deterred. Thus, the Enforcer manages to
stop the Violator’s activity by spending only $20 upfront. As long as the money in the fund
is sunk, the threat to punish becomes credible. Further, the money deposited into the fund
does not need to be paid out as a reward. It can remain in the fund to deter possible further
violations.
While the divisibility of simple sanctions can render them cheaper than simple
rewards, the enforcement costs can be further lowered if the Enforcer exploits the
divisibility feature in setting up a reversible reward fund. Here, the money deposited in the
fund at time 0 can be used, not only to fund a subsequent sanction at time 2 but also as a
direct reward to the Violator if the Violator ceases his activity voluntarily at time 1. In this
case, the Enforcer only needs to deposit just over $8 in the fund—that is, the cost to the
Enforcer is reduced from $20 to $8. Here is why: If the Violator is offered $8 as a reward to
stop the harmful activity, the Enforcer no longer has to threaten a full sanction of s =80.
Instead, a sanction of s = 72 would suffice. This is because the wedge between a reward of
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$8 and a sanction of $72 is, again, $80, equal to the Violator’s gain from the activity.
Accepting the reward confers the Violator a payoff of $8 which is no less than the net payoff
of $8 the Violator obtains from continuing the harmful activity (the benefit from activity
($80) – sanction ($72)). In order to inflict a sanction of s = 72, the cost to the Enforcer
would be 1.5s, or 72  1.5 = $108. But since $8 would be paid out the fund, the remaining
cost for the Enforcer would only be $100, and the threat to inflict it would be credible.
Thus, setting a fund of just over $8 would make the threat to sanction credible and lead the
Violator to cease the activity.
2. Formal Analysis
The Enforcer endows an irrevocable fund with U. Consider, first, a scenario in which
the fund is used solely to reimburse the Enforcer for the cost of a sanction, but is not
offered also as a reward to the Violator. Expecting to be reimbursed up to U, the maximum
sanction that the Enforcer can credibly threaten to impose is s*(U), which is the solution to:
c(s) – U = h.
If he inflicts the sanction, the Enforcer’s incurs a cost of c(s) – U. If he doesn’t, he incurs a
cost of h. Thus, when c(s) =  + s, then
s*(U) = (h+U–)/.
The minimum necessary fund to induce the Violator to forgo the benefit b and
refrain from the activity, denoted by U(b), must satisfy s*(U(b)) = b. When the sanction is
equal to the benefit, the Violator’s incentive to engage in the activity is eliminated. Thus,
U(b) =  + b – h.
Notice that the cost of the divisible sanction to the Enforcer is significantly smaller than the
cost of a simple sanction,  + b. Under plausible conditions, it is also cheaper than the cost
of a simple reward, b.12
The above scenario exploits the divisibility effect in a situation where the Enforcer
employs simple sanctions. However, the Enforcer can do even better—i.e., deter the
harmful activity at a lower cost—by using reversible rewards that combine the divisibility
The cost of the enforcement fund is lower than a simple reward whenever  + b – h < b, or b < (h
– )/(  1). The smaller the fixed cost of sanction, and the greater the variable cost, the more likely
is the enforcement fund to be cheaper than a simple reward.
12
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effect with the wedge effect. Now, the money in the fund is offered to the Violator in return
for ceasing the activity or, alternatively, to the Enforcer for financing the sanction against a
non‐compliant Violator. The minimum necessary fund to induce the Violator refrain from
the activity, U(b), must now satisfy
U(b)  b – s*(U(b)).
The Violator’s choice is either to refrain from the activity and accept the reward of U(b), or
engage in the activity with a payoff of b – s*(U(b)). The Enforcer will thus choose the
minimum U that is sufficient to induce the Violator to refrain from the detrimental activity,
which yields:
U(b) = ( + b – h)/(1+).
Relative to the simple sanction fund mechanism, the reversible reward fund reduces
the cost of the fund by a multiplier of 1/(1+). Without the reversible reward, and
exploiting the divisibility effect alone, the fund needed to be endowed with at least  + b –
h for the subsequent threat to be credible. Thus, just like in the basic analysis of reversible
rewards, any time  > 0—that is, anytime the cost of the sanction increases with the size of
the sanction—the reversible reward achieves full deterrence at a lower cost than a simple
divisible sanction fund. A reversible reward is also cheaper than a simple reward any time
U(b) < b, namely,  – h < b. Unless the fixed cost of sanction, , is so high as to overshadow
all other costs, the reversible reward scheme makes enforcement more affordable.

III. APPLICATIONS
This section illustrates the usefulness of reversible rewards in various legal settings,
where one party seeks to credibly and cost‐effectively change the incentives of another
party. Whether it is to perform a contract, refrain from harmful conduct, or settle a suit—
the affected party can combine rewards and sanctions to generate incentives more cheaply
than by using sanctions or rewards alone.
For example, a contracting party may want to prevent a harmful breach, but cannot
do so by merely threatening to sue for damages because the cost of securing a remedy is
high, or the remedy would not fully compensate the injured party. Faced with a threat to

16

breach a contract, this party can deposit some money in an irrevocable fund and offer it to
its counterparty as a reward for adequate performance (namely, as a bonus above the
already agreed upon price). If the counterparty turns down the bonus and breaches the
contract, the deposited fund could be used instead to finance the cost of securing a remedy.
By using such a reversible bonus, a contracting party can secure full performance of the
contractual obligations at a lower cost.
The same is true if a party is trying to prevent a harmful action by another, including
stop a nuisance, trespass, defamation, or pollution. When the threat to sue for redress is not
credible and does not deter, a reversible reward could be a feasible way to secure the right.
The scheme is also applicable when a party is trying to induce another party to work
harder—an employer asking an employee to exert greater effort. In fact, workers are
already subject to bonus/sanction policies. As we mentioned, construction contracts
sometimes include a bonus for early completion as well as a fine for late completion. A
reversible reward goes beyond the simple co‐utilization of rewards and sanctions; it pre‐
commits a fund to finance sanctions when rewards are turned down, thus making the
threat of sanctions more credible through a dual use of the same money.
In the remainder of this Section we survey some applications in more detail.
A. Settlement Bargaining
Reversible rewards can be employed by a defendant to improve its strategic
position and secure a more favorable settlement.13 The defendant establishes a fund and
offers the money in it to the plaintiff as settlement. If the plaintiff turns down this
settlement offer, the defendant uses the money in the fund to pay attorneys to mount a
non‐compromising defense. To the extent that such defense would make it costlier for the
plaintiff to win a judgment, the plaintiff would be better off accepting the settlement offer.
Consider the following illustration. A plaintiff has a claim that, if litigated, would
lead to a judgment of $100. If unopposed, the plaintiff would incur no litigation costs. If,
Others have noted how fee arrangements with attorney can affect the strategic structure of
settlement bargaining. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, and Andrew T. Guzman, How Would You Like to
Pay for That? The Strategic Effects of Fee Arrangements on Settlement Negotiations, 1 Harv. Neg’n L.
Rev. 53 (1996); David Croson and Robert Mnookin, Scaling the Stonewall: Retaining Lawyers to
Bolster Credibility, 1 Harv. Neg’n L. Rev. 65 (1996). Croson and Mnooking examine the effect of pre‐
committed fee on the plaintiff’s ability to extract a settlement. Here, instead, we demonstrate the
effect of a pre‐committed fund on the defendant’s ability to lower the settlement.
13
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instead, the defendant defends against the claim, the plaintiff’s litigation cost would rise.
Assume that the more the defendant spends on litigation, the costlier it would be for the
plaintiff to secure the $100 judgment. For simplicity, assume that if defendant spends C on
litigation, the plaintiff would also have to spend C to win the $100. In this scenario, the
defendant has no incentive to drag the plaintiff to litigation: he prefers to pay $100 outright
in settlement than incur $100+C in litigation. Thus, the defendant’s threat to litigate and
impose costs on the plaintiff is not credible.
The defendant can, instead, utilize a reversible reward in the following way. He
would deposit $50 in the fund and offer this sum as final settlement to the plaintiff. If the
plaintiff turns down the $50 settlement from the fund and insists on a higher settlement,
the money in the fund could be used only to fund litigation cost, up to the full value of $50
that is pre‐committed in the fund. Now, the plaintiff would be willing to settle for $50 to
avoid litigation, because litigation would yield him a payoff of $50 ($100 judgment minus
the litigation costs of $50). Because the fund is sunk, the defendant’s threat to spend the
money to litigate the case is credible. As long as the defendant cannot use the $50 in the
fund to pay for a settlement greater than $50 (that is, as long as the maximum settlement
paid from the fund is set at $50), the defendant can credibly threaten to litigate by paying
an extra $50 rather than settling for the full $100.
In this example, the reversible reward scheme saves the defendant half of the
settlement costs by reducing the cost from $100 to $50. In general, the magnitude of the
saving depends on the “sanction” that the defendant can impose—i.e., on the proportion by
which the plaintiff’s costs would rise when the defendant spends C in litigation. If, for
example, the plaintiff costs rise only by ½C, then the settlement offer would have to be $67.
Practically, for this technique to work, the defendant has to set up the fund in a way
that would make it impossible to use the money in any other way than stipulated.
Specifically, the defendant has to contract with an attorney such that, if the settlement offer
from the fund is turned down, the attorney must launch a defense with the full sum
available in the fund, and cannot free the money to pay for higher settlement offers.
Otherwise, the plaintiff would be able to undermine this scheme by counter offering a
settlement of a little less than $100.
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B. Enforcing Safety Standards
Reversible rewards can be applied as a tool in government enforcement of
regulatory standards. Consider, for example, standards relating to safety of oil drilling. The
2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico demonstrated the need for better regulation and better
enforcement. The dominant approach to a regulatory failure is to increase sanctions for
violations. But relying on a punitive approach alone is likely to be costly. Revoking or
delaying drilling licenses leads to a reduction in oil production and growth in
unemployment. The cost of importing oil or other sources of energy also go up as the
domestic supply of oil goes down. Alternatively, enforcement could be based on rewarding
and subsidizing prudent drillers for their compliance. While the idea of rewarding big oil
companies may not be politically appealing, rewards for good safety record can form an
effective and less costly regulatory response that leads to safer drilling and fewer accidents.
If the government uses a reversible reward fund, the cost of rewards could be cut
without sacrificing deterrence. Compliant firms will collect the reward; noncompliant ones
will face sanctions backed by the money freed up from the fund when the reward is not
collected. If oil companies still chose to engage in unsafe drilling, they would face a higher
likelihood of penalties as earmarked funds would be reversed to cover the government’s
costs of punishing them. The pre‐commitment element of the fund would be particularly
helpful in the case of drilling. Oil companies may not be adequately deterred as they count
on regulators’ unwillingness to rein in drilling due to the importance of oil for the country’s
energy security and independence. The credibility of sanctions can also be compromised
given that oil companies are big donors for politicians. The risk of regulatory capture may
dilute the credibility of a threat to sanction in the absence of a mechanism that sends a
credible signal of the government’s commitment to punish precarious drilling. Setting up a
pre‐committed fund could also offer an effective way of tying the hands of the next
administration that might be less willing to regulate drilling.
Finally, the fund could be financed through royalties that the oil companies pay to
the government in return for a permission to drill.

When engaged in particularly

dangerous drilling activities (i.e., deep‐water offshore drilling), the company would need to
pay a higher royalty to the fund. Similarly, royalty rates would increase with a history of
accidents—in the way car insurance payment increases when the driver has manifested his
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propensity for accidents. Here, the most reckless drillers would end up financing the bulk
of the fund, including the rewards for their prudent competitors and the government’s
efforts to sanction the reckless drillers themselves. This should offer a more potent—and
less costly—way to regulate oil companies than simply racking up civil and criminal fines
or trying to halt drilling altogether, assuming safe drilling still is socially beneficial.
C. International Enforcement
Enforcement problems are particularly challenging in the international context. In
the absence of supranational enforcement bodies, states are not able to rely on an objective
third party carrying out enforcement on their behalf. States sometimes resort to economic
sanctions, and occasionally the use of military force—but these are costly and often
unsuccessful. Trade sanctions, for example, impose costs on the sanctioning state whose
firms and consumers are deprived from the benefits of economic exchange. Other times,
states try to enforce international law by offering rewards to violators if they cease their
harmful activity. The US could, for instance, offer direct cash transfer to compensate a
polluting country for the cost of reducing pollution and retrofitting its plants. But these
rewards, too, are costly and often politically contentious.
These enforcement problems are often magnified by collective actions problems.
International treaties aimed at solving global cooperation problems are notoriously hard to
enforce. International organizations and courts are limited in their ability to levy sanctions
on free riders. Individual countries and ad‐hoc coalitions can at times coordinate sanctions
for violations, but for problem of global importance coordination is often elusive.
The ongoing effort to negotiate a new global climate change treaty is an illustrative
example of a complex multilateral enforcement challenge. While all states would benefit
from collective efforts to limit their emissions, they also have the incentive to free ride on
other states’ efforts to protect the climate. Recent efforts to enact a new global climate
treaty have failed because “enforcers”—states eager to reduce emissions—have been
unable to persuade “violators” to join a treaty. The cost of buying off the cooperation of
countries like China would simply be too high—China has requested an annual transfer of
$300 billion from developed countries to finance developing countries’ efforts to fight

20

climate change.14 The cost of levying effective trade sanctions on an economic power like
China is also prohibitive. For example, a carbon border tax on Chinese imports would
impose costs on domestic firms and consumers who would be deprived of cheap Chinese
imports.
Reversible rewards could generate more compliance than the reliance on sanctions
or rewards alone. The scheme would work as follows. Enforcers—most prominently, the
EU and the United States—would set up a fund. Instead of endowing it with the full $300
billion that potential violators are demanding for joining the treaty, Enforcers would
deposit only about half the amount in the fund. The fund would reward China (and possible
other violators) for compliance, by financing China’s transformation of its energy
infrastructure, transferring environmental technologies, or paying for a host of other
tangible inducements. However, if China fails to join a treaty or to fully comply with it, the
money in the fund would be used reimburse Enforcers for the costs of inflicting sanctions
against China. If the sanction consists of a carbon border tax, the fund could compensate
adversely affected domestic parties. Or, the fund could grant subsidies for industries that
compete with Chinese manufacturers. It could also be used to cover the costs of mitigating
the damage from China’s possible trade retaliation.
Thus if the reversible reward is, say, $150 billion, it would create an inducement
that is roughly equal to a simple reward of $300 billion. The choice for China between
violation and compliance has a payoff effect of $300 billion.
The primary advantage of the reversible reward is its ability to enhance the
credibility and reduce the cost of enforcement. A secondary advantage is in mitigating the
collective action problem among the various enforcers who have the incentive to free ride
on each others’ enforcement efforts. By using a pre‐committed fund, each state’s
participation is measured not by the sanctions it actually levies (on which they have an
incentive to cheat and which are hard to monitor), but instead by the amount it contributes
to the fund. Unless everybody contributes, no one contributes. Later, if sanctions turn out

In the Copenhagen Conference in 2009, China requested that developed countries commit one
percent of their GDP—amounting to over $300 billion annually—to a fund that would help China
and other developing countries to comply with the proposed climate treaty. Michael Levi,
Copenhagen's Inconvenient Truth, FIN. TIMES, Sept./Oct., 2009.
14
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to be necessary, enforcers have fewer incentives to defect and free ride because their cost
of sanctioning is fully reimbursed from the fund.
Moreover, to the extent that sanctions are costly to administer, coordinating the
sanctions through a centralized fund makes it possible for participating states to allocate
the enforcement burden in the most efficient way. For instance, if the cost to one Enforcer
of imposing sanctions on China is particularly high, this Enforcer does not need to
participate in the actual sanctioning and can instead shoulder the burden by paying more
in setting up the reversible reward fund. This is also an option for a state that imports little
from China—making their threat to restrict trade vis‐à‐vis China futile. Finally, as the total
cost of enforcement is reduced through reversible rewards, it is likely to be easier to
harness a larger coalition of Enforcers to join the enforcement effort in the first place.
D. Foreclosure
Carrying out foreclosure of mortgaged property, or eviction of residential rental
property, is expensive for mortgage lenders and for landlords. It is time consuming, during
which the property depreciates at a greater pace and, at worst, may even get destroyed by
recalcitrant owners and tenants. In these settings the law prohibits self‐help, and so
eviction requires non‐trivial legal costs and private enforcement measures, and can be
simply unpleasant. Indeed, properties coming out of foreclosure sell for a substantial
discount, sometimes exceeding 25% of the value of the property.15 The weakness of
enforcement is costly to the creditors.
To avoid the costs of sanctioning the defaulting homeowners through litigation and
foreclosure proceedings, creditors can instead offer a reward for those who evict
voluntarily and swiftly. But as long as homeowners can impose substantial costs on the
creditors by refusing to vacate the property voluntarily, the reward necessary to buy their
compliance might be substantial.
Instead, creditors could use reversible rewards. Money would be placed in a fund
specifically aimed at foreclosing a particular property. It would be offered as reward to a
homeowner that voluntary vacates the property in good condition. If the homeowner fails
to vacate the premises, the funds would be used to cover the costs of the evictions. Because
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this money is sunk and can only be accessed by the foreclosing agents, homeowners are
more likely to face immediate forceful eviction and would thus be induced to accept the
reward instead. As we showed above, it would require a smaller reward to successfully
evict the reluctant homeowner when that reward is reversible.
Further, the fund could be established ex ante and financed by the homeowner. A
condition to securing a mortgage could be a contribution by the borrower into a fund that
would remain untouched until some fraction of the mortgage is paid off, or until default
occurs. If the mortgage is paid off, the money would be returned to the homeowner. If,
instead, default occurs, the fund is immediately withdrawn and offered as reward to the
homeowner for immediate eviction, else used by the creditor to cover foreclosure costs.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has demonstrated a novel way in which rewards and sanctions can be
combined to reduce enforcement costs. The idea is to initially set aside earmarked funds
that can subsequently be used to purchase either a carrot or a stick. By pre‐committing the
fund, a reward can be reinforced with a (now costless) threat of sanction. This scheme
doubles the deterrent effect on the target.
Reversible rewards can be used to improve enforcement in a socially desirable way,
for example by enticing corporations to adopt better safety standards, or countries to
pursue efforts to halt climate change. But reversible rewards can also be used in socially
harmful ways. For example, a dominant firm seeking to reduce competition can try to
intimidate its competitors. It can use rewards (e.g., bribes to competitors to leave a market)
or sanctions (e.g. price war). But since both strategies are costly, a reversible reward could
induce the competitor to acquiesce where it otherwise would not, and thus allow the
dominant firm to capture the market at a smaller cost.
Why have reversible rewards not been used in practice? Since sanctions and rewards are
used all the time—and sometimes interchangeably—it is puzzling why a simple scheme
that outperforms them is not utilized. Elements of this scheme are familiar from other
arrangements.

For example, attorneys are sometimes paid a retainer fee—a pre‐

committed remuneration irrespective of the amount of work invested—which enhances
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the strategic position of their client vis‐à‐vis its counterparty.16 Another example relates to
bail arrangements: a defendant who posts bail is deterred from fleeing in two ways: first, a
fleeing defendant loses the bail money; and second, the money that he posted and forfeited
can be used to fund bounty hunters, which increases the likelihood that the defendant will
be apprehended. But neither of these schemes combines the pre‐commitment and the
reversibility features in the way reversible rewards do. Thus, the idea of reversing the
rewards remains unexploited despite its potential to contribute to more credible and less
costly enforcement of law. Having explored a variety of applications for reversible rewards,
we think that its main value is in the international enforcement sphere, in which
enforcement problems dominate. Accordingly, in a companion article we examine in
greater detail the ways in which reversible rewards could be applied in international law.17

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Omri Ben-Shahar
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
omri@uchicago.edu

16
17

Croson and Mnookin, supra note 13.
Omri Ben‐Shahar and Anu Bradford [cite].

24

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
For a listing of papers 1–500 please go to Working Papers at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html

501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.

Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with Incrementalism (November 2009)
Tom Ginsburg, The Arbitrator as Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always Pro-Arbitration
(December 2009)
Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Reputation, Information and the Organization of the Judiciary
(December 2009)
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Economic Foundations of the Law of the Sea (December 2009)
Jacob E. Gersen and Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency in the
Administrative State (December 2009)
Richard A. Epstein, Impermissible Ratemaking in Health-Insurance Reform: Why the Reid Bill is
Unconstitutional (December 2009)
Tom Ginsburg and Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism (January 2010)
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of
Publications, Citations, and Reversals (January 2010)
Joseph Isenbergh, The Future of Taxation (January 2010)
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis (January 2010)
Tom Ginsburg, James Melton, and Zachary Elkiins, The Endurance of National Constitutions (February
2010)
Omri Ben-Shahar and Anu Bradford, The Economics of Climate Enforcement (February 2010)
Neta-li E. Gottlieb, Free to Air? Legal Protection for TV Program Formats (February 2010)
Omri Ben-Shahar and Eric A. Posner, The Right to Withdraw in Contract Law (March 2010)
Richard A. Epstein, Inside the Coasean Firm: Competence as a Random Variable (March 2010)
Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure (March 2010)
Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and Comparative
Perspectives (March 2010)
Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk (April 2010)
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Judicial Ability and Securities Class Actions (April 2010)
Jonathan S. Masur and Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief (April 2010)
M. Todd Henderson, Implicit Compensation, May 2010
Lee Anne Fennell, Possession Puzzles, June 2010
Randal C. Picker, Organizing Competition and Cooperation after American Needle, June 2010
Richard A. Epstein, What Is So Special about Intangible Property? The Case for intelligent Carryovers,
August 2010
Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, August
2010
Richard A. Epstein, Carbon Dioxide: Our Newest Pollutant, August 2010
Richard A. Epstein and F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory Licensing
for Pharmaceutical Patents, August 2010
Richard A. Epstein, One Bridge Too Far: Why the Employee Free Choice Act Has, and Should, Fail,
August 2010
Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, August 2010
Bernard E. Harcourt and Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, August 2010
Ariel Porat and Avraham Tabbach, Risk of Death, August 2010
Randal C. Picker, The Razors-and-Blades Myth(s), September 2010
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation, September 2010
Omri Ben Shahar, Damanged for Unlicensed Use, September 2010
Bermard E. Harcourt, Risk As a Proxy for Race, September 2010
Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, Voters, Non-Voters, and the Implications of Election Timing for
Public Policy, September 2010
Eric A. Posner, Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Reciprocity, September 2010

25

538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.

545.
546.
547
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.

Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, October 2010
Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, Agency Design and Distributive Politics, October 2010
Eric A. Posner, The Constitution of the Roman Republic: A Political Economy Perspective, November
2010
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt Contracts: A Greek
Case Study with Implications for the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism, Novemer 2010
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducint Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of Mental
Hospitals in the 1960s, January 2011
Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, January 201l
Bernard E. Harcourt, Making Willing Bodies: Manufacturing Consent among Prisoners and Soldiers,
Creating Human Subjects, Patriots, and Everyday Citizens—The University of Chicago Malaria
Experiments on Prisoners at Stateville Penitentiary, February 2011
Tom Ginsburg and Thomas J. Miles, Empiricism and the Rising Incidence of Coauthorship in Law,
February 2011
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal Remedies, “Legalized
Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, March 2011
Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, March 2011
Tom Ginsburg, An Economic Interpretation of the Pastunwalli, March 2011
Eduardo Moises Penalver and Lior Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process, April 2011
Stephen J. Choi, Gurang Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, The Law and Policy of Judicial Retirement, April
2011
Douglas G. Baird, Car Trouble, May 2011
Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, May 2011
Saul Levmore and Ariel Porat, Bargaining with Double Jeopardy, May 2011
Adam B. Cox and Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering, May 2011
David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Free, May 2011
Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, June 2011
Omri Ben-Shahar and Anu Bradford, Reversible Rewards, June 2011

26

